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In the development of the law one of the most im-
portant and interesting agencies has been the use of legal
fictions, and it also may be 3aid that no part of the English
law has been so severely criticised or so greatly praised by
eminent men. Bentham is probably the most severe in his
denunciation of the use of fictions of law while such men as
Blackstone, and Sir, Henry ,aine are equally sincere in up-
holding and praising them.
Perhaps the idea that legal fictions are of no great
practical importance to the lawyer, accounts for the little
that is to be found on the subject in legal literature.
Although there are very frequent allusions to them in the
cases and text-books yet on investigation into the subject a
chapter or a few paragraphs here and there ,will be found to
be about all that has been devoted to the subject by any one
writer..
1Ir. Best in his book on E idence and presumptions, de-
fines a fiction as "1 A rule of law which assumes as true,
and will not allow to be disproved, something which is false
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but not impossible." Most of the definitions given in
the books are substantially like that of Mr. Best's. Fictions
are of many different kinds and although this definition
probably takes in the greater number of them, yet there are
various devices which do not come under that definition which
must nevertheless be called fiction.
Sir.Henry ilaine employs the expression " Legal Fiction"
to signify any assumption which conceals, or affects to con-
ceal, the fact that a rule of law has undergone alteration,
its letter remaining unchanged, its operation being modified;
but probably the best definition that has been given is that
" A le-al fiction is a devise for attaining a desired legal
consequence, or avoiding an undesired legal consequence".
A good definition of this as of nearly every other subject of
the law, is well nigh impossible, and when it comes to a
classification it is even more difficult. Mr.Best and a
few other writers have attempted to classify these devices,
but because of their number and their great dissimilarity, it
is almost impossible to make a satisfactory classification,
and if it could be done it is hard to see of what practical
value it would be,.
it is impossible to discover how long legal fictions
have been in use, but probably they have been used ever since
the conduct of man has been regulated by positive law . The
oldest code of laws extant, provides that an ox should be
stoned for goring a man or woman to death. Exodus, Ch.XXI.
verse,28. This law against an offending thing is the legal
fiction of the primary responsibility of property, which is
the basis of all proceedings in rem.
We find many fictions which have been used by the Greeks
and Romans, but no system of law7s has so abounded in their
use as has the English. This may seem strang because it is
quite generally believed, and it would seem to be almost a
natural law, that fictions abound most in primitive civiliza-
tion, and as civilization advances new laws are enacted which
do away with fictions, and thus they seem to diminish in nun-
ber; hence it would be a natural supposition that as the
world's sceptre passed from Persia to Greece, from Greece to
Italy, and from Italy to Great Britain, each nation copying
the good and leaving out the bad usages and laws of its pred-
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ecessor, that these " Excrescences of' the law" as thy have
been called,v;ould be very few in English law uompared with the
other legal systems of the world. But the English system
of jurisprudence has ever beon a fruitful soil for the weeds
of fiction. Vhiere these wt eds have grown up and hindered
the growth of the cultivated plants, and where they could be
uprooted without destroying the other plants, they have been
uprooted; but some weeds by cultivation become as beautiful
and as useful as the plants themselves and where this has
been the case they have been preserved. Thus some fictions
grew up and flourished which afterwards died out because new
laws were enacted to supply their :lace, while others have
come into use and still form an important part of thelaw .
In looking at the reasons why the law is so permeated
with fictions perhaps we will be able to aee whether they
have hindered the development of the law or aided it.
The introduction of the feudal system into England has
been the primary cause of the fictions in regard to real
property which are many, but a discussion of any particular
part of the subject is not the purpose of this article, b.t
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rather to treat of fictions generally without enumerating
them; indeed, to discuss the origin and history of all the
fictions of law, would require a treatise of great length.
The English people have always been noted for their
conservatism, theIr reverance for old and established usages,
customs and laws. As society advances theese stationery
laws and customs are left at variance with the needs and re-
quirements of such society. The gulf thus cut between
custom. and the wants of society, has always been necessarily
a fertile cause for the origin of legal fictions, and indeed
Mr.M1aine has: assumed that this is their only cause.
It has been said that " There are two causes that have
ever given rise to legal fiction, and they may be both found
in the constitution of man. The first is his disposition to
be conservative, the other his disposition to be just. " While
the law remains stable society is progressive and thus social
necessities and custou:,s are always in advance of the law, and
some of the laws become inapplicable to the wants of society.
Judges are licensed by well established principles, to so
construe the law that it will serve the ends of justice and
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yet conceal the fact that the law has undergone a change
Blackstone says that there are three points to be con-
sidered in the construction of all remedial statutes . The
old law, the mischief, and the remedy: that is, how the com-
mon law stood at the making .f the act : what the mischief
was for which the common law did not provide; and what rem-
edy the Parliament has provided to cure the mischief, " and
it is the busin ss of the court to so construe the act as to
suppress the mischief and advance theremedy." 1 Blackstone
Comm., 87.
If a law was passed which would work injustice in any casa
The court generally put such a construction on it as would do
justice in the case, and this practice necessarily resulted
in many fictions.
The existence of fictions is no doubt evidence that the
law i defective, but it is also evidence that the law with
the help of human ingenuity, might be bent to fill up the
wants.
It is true that in one sense fictions may be said to
hinder in the development of the law because of the fact that
-7-
a new law is less wanted after the invention of a fiction
than before. If there is a class of rights which there is
no law to direct their control it is easy to see tha by the
invention of a fiction to cover those rights the pressure
which would otherwise be brought to bear on the legislature
to have the law changed to satisfy those wants, would be re-
moved, and so the fiction becomes established in the law
where a statute would give the sane relief and render the law
more systemetic and easy of comprehension. But it has been
said by a writer in the London Law Magazine And Review, that
. In some cases it is quite possible that the machinery of
the fiction may be as easy of use as any that could be estab-
lished by statute; in stch cases it is always better to keep
a method proved and well understood, than to adopt one which
however seemingly more elegant, may bring difficulties into
some other part of the law; and it is often impossible to be
sure that any new enactment may not do so. If a strong case
cannot be made against the means used in the fiction either
because they are difficult to use or are to expensive or the
like, we should say, hold to the fiction rather than bring in
-8-
a new law only for the sake of affecting the same ends by
otler means; but if it is wished to enlarge powers or in
'act to do more than could be done by the fiction, than do
not tinker up the fiction but do straightforwardly what is
wanted to be done."
An ex=nple of the development of the law without posi-
tivo statutes may be seen in English Constitutional law, which
is of course honeycombed with fictions.. Although the rules
and laws in this bran.cA of the English law have been the same
for centuries, yet there has been constant change 7oing on in
construing :em, and it has been said that the entire series
of formal )ropositions called the English Constitution is
merely a series of fiction.
Fictions were doubtless of great value in oreating reme-
dies for wrongs which could not otherwise'be obtained until
the legislature had been brought to see that new laws were
needed; but when this has been done, and the fictions one
after another have ceased to exist, great advance has been
made in the reconstruction of the legal system, which, al-
though impossible of ultimate perfection, yet is steadily
-D-
being improved, and brought nearer ±o that end.
But while the greater part of the old remedial fictions
have been banished by legislation from the procedure of the
courts~yet there are many ztill remaining in our procedure
to-day, such as the action for the recovery of damages for
seduction, which is still nominally an action by the father
for the loss of his daughter's services, and also quasi con-
tract actions as for instance the action where any one, who,
in the commission of a tort has enriched himself at the ex-
pense of another, the latter may waive the tort and sue in
assumpsit for goods sold and delivered, for money had and
received.
Quasi.contracts are a very important class of legal
fictions and it will perhaps be well to devote the rest of
this article to their consideration, dwelling more particu-
larly on the cese noted above, of waivor of tort and sued on
contract.
An express contract is one entered into by agreement of
the rarties, and upon which, if broken an action for damages
will lie for breach; or the contract may be implied where
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the intention of the parties, though not expressed in words,
may be inferred or gathered from the circumstances of the
case. Both must result from a free exercise of the will
and a meoting of minds. There is another class of cases
where personz have not strictly entered into any contract at
all, but between whom there are circiumstances which make it
just that ne should have a right and the other be subject to
a liability similar to the rights and liabilities in express
contracts . This latter class of cases come under the head
of quasi contracts where there is no consent of the parties
and no intention to make a contract, but where the law, for
the sake of givin7 a remedy, creates an obligation, or, as
has often been said, implies a contract.
But before going further into this subject a brief allus-
ion to the confusion which has wrisen by the use of the term
" Implied Contracts" to denote several different meanings,
may not be out of place. If the term implied contract be
used indifferently to denote one (1), ficticious creations of
law, where there is no meeting of mind and no intention to
contract; (2), a true or actual but tacit contract, the is,
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one where a meeting of minds or a mutual understanding is
infered as matter of fact from circumstances, no verbal or
written words having been used; and, (3). that state of
things where one is estopped by his conduct to deny a contract
although in fact he has not made or intended to make one, it
is not strange that confusion should result :nd disputes arise
wher there is no difference of opiniol; as to the substance
of the matter in controversy; whereas, were a different term
applied to each, as, for example, that of legal duty or con-
structive contracts to-designate the first, contrw ts simply
to designate the second, and contracts by estoppel the
third, this difficulty would be avoided. It would of
course be the same thing in substance, if the first were al-
ways called an implied contract, while the other two were
otherwise designated in such a manner as to show distinctly
what is meant.
Blackstone says u Implied contracts are such as rex on
and justice dictate, and which, therefore the law presumes
every man undertakes to perform." 2 Blackstone, 443. This
definition is a good definition of a qyasi contract, but all
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the illustrations he gives under it are cwntracts implied in
fact or which may be inferred from the acts of the parties.
In the case of liertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa.St., 405, the
learned judge in referring to this subject says: 0 There is
somo looseness of thought in supposing 'hat repson and justice
ever dictate any contract 1etween the parties or impose such
upcn them. All true contracts grow out of the intention of
the parties to the transaction, and are dictated by their
mutaual and accordant wills . When this intention is express
ed it may be inferred, implied, or presumed, from circumstan-
ces as really existing; and then the contract thus ascertain-
ed is called an implied one. The instances given by Black-
stone are illustrations of this."
,, But it appears in another place, III. Comm. lV-166,
that Blackstone introduces this thought about reason and jus-
tice dictating contracts, in order to embrace under this def-
inition of an implied contract, another large class of rela-
tions which involve no intention to contract at all although
they may be treated as they did. Thus whenever not our
variant notions of reason and justice, but the cormon sense
-17-
and common justice and therefore the common law and the stat-
ute law of the country impose upon any a .uty irrespective of
contract, and allow it to be enforced by a contract remedy,
he calls this an implied contract. Thus out of tort grows
the duty of com-.ensation, and in many cases the tort may be
waived and the action brought in assumpsit."
It is quite apparent therefore that radically different
relations are classified under the same term ; and this must
often give rise to indistinctness of thought , and this is
not at all necessarily; for we have another well authorized
technical term exactly adopted to the office of making the
true distinction. The latter class are merely constructive
contracts, while the former are truly implied ones. In one
case the contract is a mere fiction, a form imposed in order
to adapt the case to a given reriedy; in the other , it is
ascertained and enforced.
In the case of Rhodes v. Rhodes, 44 Ch.Div., 94, Lord
Justice Lindley, referring to this unfortunate terminology of
our law, says: " The expression implied contract has been used
to denote, not only genuine contracts established by infer-
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ence, but also obligations which do not arise from any real
contract, but which can be enforced as if they had a con-
tractual origin."
The answer to the question why this classification which
produces so much confusion was ever adopted, must be sought
for, not in the substantive law, but in thelaw of remedies
and remedial rights.
At common law outside of equity, the only two remedies
were ex contractu and ex delicto, and if a wrong vras commit-
ted which would not sustain an action in tort or contract,
then the aggrieved party was without redress. In order to
supply a remedy for such causes of actions the judges, by
means of legal fictions, had to adapt old remedies to new
causes of actions. The action of assumpsit was the most
available remedy, and by means of this form of action the law
of quasi contract was established in our legal system.
The obligations which may be said to be uasi contractual
include, judgments, which are considered contracts of record;
all obligations imposed by statute which do not rest upon the
consent of the parties; the liability of common carriers and
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inn-keepers, and the sheriff's obligation to levy execution
and to pay the proceeds to the judgment creditor.
But by far the most important class of quasi contracts
are those cases where the plaintff's right to recover rests
upon the doctrine that a man should not be allowed to enrich
himself unjustly ut the expense of another.
In this class are included the liability of infants and
lunatics for ne3essaries. In these cases, although the
parties are considered as unable to make a contract, and
there can be no valid consent to a contract, yet on the doc-
trine of unjust enrichment they are held liable as if there
was a valid and legal contract. Of the same nature also is
the liability of the husband and father to pay for necessaries
furnished his wife or children.
The right to recover money paid under a mistake is a
quasi contractual obligation , for it is easily seen that in
this case there was no intention to create an obligation.
Passing now to a consideration of the impottant quasi
contract action, known as waiver of tort and sued on contract,
it is laid down as law, and established by the decisions of
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many courts , that where any one in the connission of a tort
has unjustly enriched himself at the expense of another , the
latter has an1 election of remedies. He may sue to regain
possession of the property or he may waive the tort and freat
the transaction as a sale and sue in assumpsit.
The action of assumpsit is based upon the contiact be-
tween the parties and a promise must always be alleged, and
at one time this allegL.tion must be proved. The courts
therefore, in usingthis purely contractual remedy to give
relief in a class of cases possessing none of the elements of
a contract, had to resort to fictions to justify such a coursq
and the insuperable difficulty of proving a promise where the
there was none was met by the statement that " the law implie
a promise". The fiction of a promise then was adopted in
this class of cases solely that the remedy of assumpsit might
be used to cover a class of cases where, in fact, there was
nc 7romise.
un
When a man's pro-erty has/justly been taken from him, as
has been said before, he has his -right to elect which of two
remedies he will pursue, and if he elects t; sue in assumpsit
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and avers a sale and recovers judgment, he ceaanot sue and
recover back the property also; and this is so if he is
unable to Set his judgment satisfied. Having once elected
to treat the transaction as a sale he cannot afterwards, when
this remedy fails rescind the sale and sue to re.over the
goods. This is so on account of the doftrine res adjudicata.
And likewise if lie had sued to recover back the goods and
this remedy failed, an action against the same defendant for
goods sold and delivered or money had and received, would be
barred. This is because no one on be subject to a double
vexation. But where the plaintiff has an unsatisfied judg-
ment against one of two or more tort feasors , the doctrine
of double vexation does not apply if he attempts to recover
against the other.
There is a conflict :If authority as to whether, where the
plaintiff has elected to treat the transaction as a sale and
gets a judgment which is unsatisfied against one joint tort
feasor, he has the right to recover the property in an action
against the other, some courts holding that having once treat'.-
ed the transaction *s a sale he cannot afterwards say thet
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there was no sale, and the sale will be complete and the
title will pass as soon as he has elected to so treat it.
'The most important case holding this way.is the case of
Terry v. llunger, 121 N.Y., 101,. The reasoning of the court
is shown by the following extract from the opinion of Peckham J.
. The contract implied is one to pay the value of prope.ty
as if it had been sold to the wrong-doer by the owner. If t
the tra.saction is thus hold by the plaintiff as a sale of
course the title to the property passes when the plaintiff
elects so to treat it."
" The plaintiff having treated the title to the property
as passed in that suit by such sale can he now maintain an
action against another person, who was not a party to that
action, to recover damages from him for his alleged conversion
of the same property which conversion is founded upon his
participation in the same act which the plaintiff, in the old
suit has already treated as constituting a sale of the prop-
I'
erty? We think not.
1 The fact that the plaintiff sold the property by virtue
of the transaction which he now seeks to treat as a conversion
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of it by the defendant, must and ought to be a perfect bar to
the maintenance of this actio-.. It it upon the principle
that the plaintiff by his own free will decided to sell the
property and having done so, it necessarily follows that they
have no cause of action against the defendant for an alleged
conversion of the property by the &ame acts which he has al-
ready treated as a sale. The trans-er of title did not de-
pend upon the plaintiff's recovering satisfaction in such
action for the purchase price."
It is here respectfully adiitted that this decision is
not justified in a state like New York, where all technical-
ities as to form have Dcen done away with and where courts
pretend to get at the substance merely. There is an old
maxim that " In fictione Juris s e", and yet
here is a case where a fiction has been resorted to for the
purpose of denying a right. There is another maxim that a
fiction shall only be resorted to for the purpose of giving
a remedy and for all other purposes the truth may be proved.
Here as every one can see there is no sale and in fact the
plaintiff could only recover in his former action by proving
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that there was a tort and yet the court hold that there was
a sale and would not allow it to be disproved . This is an
exanple of the abuse of fiction and as it is no longer nec-
essary to resort to their use in such cases as the above
their further use in such cases cannot be justified.
Of the cases opposed to Terry v. L unger, perhaps the
best example is the case of Huffman v. Hugh;ett, ll Lea, 549.
In that case the plaintiff had sued one of the joint tort
feasors for the value of certain timber and then, that action
having been discontinued he sued the defendant in this case
for conversion, and the latter set up the defense that the
plaintiff had elected to treat the transaction as a sale in
the former actiolx and therefore the tort had been waived. But
the court through Cooper J!, said. "If the action be in con-
tract it is not strictly a waiver of the tort, for the tort
is the very foundation of' the action' but, as Nicholson C.J.
has expressed it, a waiver of the "damages for conversion,
and suing for value of the property. It is simply an elect-
ion of remedies for an act done leaving the rights of the
injured party against the wrongdoer unimpaired until he has
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obtained legal satisfaction. If it were otherwise, the
suing of any one of a series of tort feasors, oven the last-
6n the implied promise when there was clearly no contract,
would give him a good title and relieve all the others. No
authority has b en produced sustaining such a conclusion and
we are not inclined to make one."
As cpposed to the doctrine of Terry v. M unger, it seems
plain that this decision is just and fair, that it violates
no legal principle and that it sustains the maxim that no
fiction is ' justifiable to deny a right and it is therefore
the best law.
There is no reason to believe but what fictions have
been of great value in dwveloping the law and when form and
minuteness of detail was essential to the proceedure of the
courts, a frequent resort to their use could not be avoided,
but now when substance is paramount to form, there is no
excuse for their use in many cases where they are now employ-
ed. Such fictions should be abolished.
Fictions which are merely condensed methods of stating
established legal principles are much harder to deal with
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such as for instance the fictions that the husband and wife
are one person. The act of the servant is the act of the
some
master etc.. These fictions could not be abolished with out/,
reconstruction of the law or manner of stating law.
Then there is the fiction which is probably the greatest
of all, that every one is presumed to know the law-- Without
this there would result much confusion and it would be im-
possible to enforce the law at all.
Fictions are of so many kinds and are so different in
their characters that it would be wrong to say that they
should be abolished and it would be just as illogical to say
that they should be preserved-- "out as to certain classes we
can determine whether they are a benefit or a detriment to
the law Asto fictions which relate to proceedure it seems
that the only just conclusion we can reach is t1a.t they are
no lomger of use abd that they should be discontinued, but
as to fictions which are merely condensed statements of law or
w.rhich seek to reconcile an existing rule of law with some
implied ethical standard it would be impracticable to abolish
them without a reconstruction of the legal speach or until
-23 -
the legal system reaches the 
-oal of perfection tovard which
it is steadily advancing.

